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Abstract
Many couples do not sign prenuptial agreements, even though this
often leads to costly and ineﬃcient litigation in case of divorce. In this
paper we show that strategic reasons may prevent agents from sign-
ing a prenuptial agreement. Partners which have high productivity
in marital activities wish to signal their type by running the risk of a
costly divorce. Hence this contract incompleteness arises as a screening
device. Moreover, the threat of costly divorce is credible since the lack
of an ex-ante agreement leads to a moral hazard problem within the
couple, which induces partners to reject any ex-post amicable agree-
ment, under speciﬁc circumstances. We also investigate conditions
that make this contract incompleteness an optimal form of contract-
ing and we brieﬂyd i s c u s st h ee ﬀects of enforceable and/or mandatory
premarital agreements on the rate of divorce and on the social welfare.
Finally, our model suggests that there is no major objection in
making prenuptial agreements enforceable, but also that there are not
good reasons to make them mandatory.
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11 Introduction
In the present paper we study why economic agents may rationally choose
not to sign speciﬁc kind of contracts, or equivalently, why they may omit
speciﬁc clauses when signing a contract. Our leading example will be the
modest diﬀusion of prenuptial agreements.
Prenuptial agreements usually include clauses on how partners should
behave during marriage and on how they should divide the common assets
in case of divorce. Even though it is quite clear that prenuptial agreements
allow savings in litigation costs, they are still uncommon. “Legal commen-
tators and practitioners estimate that only 5-10% of the (USA) population
enter into prenuptial agreements, and one study suggests that only 1.5% of
marriage licence applicants would consider entering into such agreement”
(H. Mahar, 2003). Referring to the literature on incomplete contracts, the
usual justiﬁcations for this phenomenon are the lack of enforceability, the
presence of transaction costs and, ﬁnally, agents’ excessively optimistic ex-
pectations.
None of these explanations survives at a closer scrutiny in the case of
prenuptial agreements. For instance, many States in USA have nowadays
adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA)1. This Act pro-
vides that courts must enforce premarital agreements, whenever they sat-
isfy some simple formalities2. Similar reforms have been adopted in other
countries, e.g., Australia. Therefore it is diﬃcult to assume that in these
countries (or states) prenuptial agreements are diﬃcult to enforce.
1Drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners On Uniform State Law in 1983.
This Act is now adopted in some form in many States.
2“A premarital agreement must be in writing and signed by both parties. It is en-
forceable without consideration.” (UPAA, Section 2 ). Section 6 establishes substantive
requirements for enforceability. Basically it is required the agreements to be voluntary ex-
ecuted and each party to have (before execution) an adequate knowledge of the property
or ﬁnancial obligations of the other party.
2As far as it regards the cost of prenuptial agreements, it might be very
high if the involved agents have complex activities, but for more common
people many Internet sites oﬀer kits which help to stipulate premarital agree-
ments at a very low cost, without (the help of) any legal advisors.3 The costs
of contracting might also be a consequence of forecasting problems. Also this
explanation is not satisfactory, since many marriages end within the early
years of the union (one ﬁfth of ﬁrst marriages ends within 5 years, and one
third ends within 10, see Bramlett and Moshler (2001)). Therefore the rate
o fd i v o r c ei sh i g hi nt h eﬁrst years of marriage, making less diﬃcult to write
ex-ante a satisfactory agreement on how to divorce.
Nevertheless couples could have too optimistic estimates of the probabil-
ity of divorce. For instance there could be a wrong perception of the overall
divorce rate.4 However, from interviews conducted in the US it seems that
people correctly estimates the divorce rates, but that most people assume
a much lower probability that they will personally divorce than the overall
rate (H. Mahar, 2003). Thus there is some evidence of excessively optimistic
expectations, but wrong expectations can never explain why most people do
not even sign postnuptial agreements when marriage comes into a crisis, or
why a signiﬁcant number of couples choose an adversarial divorce and not
an amicable one.
If none of the previous explanations seems convincing, we still have to
ﬁnd one. The already quoted contribution by H. Mahar (2003) suggests an
interesting one. In the interviews there reported, 60% of the respondents
considers receiving a proposal of a prenuptial agreement a bad signal. The
signaling content of the contract will be our starting point.
3See, for example, www.mylawyer.com for US law, or www.canlaw.com for Canadian
law.
4See, for instance Baker and Emery (1993).
3The stream of literature more closely related to our contribution, takes
into consideration the strategic contents of the contracting activity. Non-
contigent contracts as a signaling/ screening device are analyzed in Aghion-
Bolton (1987), Diamond (1993) Hermalin (2001), Bordignon and Brusco
(2001), and especially Spier’s (1992). Incomplete contracts may help in
establishing the appropriate incentive in presence of imperfect veriﬁability
(Bernheim and Whinston (1998)). However, even though the last two contri-
butions deal with the endogenization of incomplete contracts, none of them
is able to prove that the contract remains incomplete as the costs of the com-
plete contract (included the cost of veriﬁability) disappear. In Spier (1992)
the opposite is proved. Therefore, in these contributions strategic considera-
tions can amplify contract incompleteness, but they cannot be their primary
source.
Summarizing what said so far, a missing (premarital) agreement is an
extreme form of contract incompleteness, however, we depart from the in-
complete contracts literature quite substantially. In fact, this literature jus-
tiﬁes incomplete contracts through the presence of some form of complexity
costs. These can be either costs associated with the diﬃculty (or impossi-
bility) to foresee the future contractually relevant contingencies (Hart and
Moore (1990), (1999)), or the costs of writing ex-ante the contract (Dye
(1985), Anderlini and Felli (1999) (2001), Battigalli and Maggi (2002)), or
ﬁnally the costs of veriﬁcation ex-post (Townsend (1979)).5 Hence in all
this literature it is assumed that complete contracts are more costly than
incomplete ones. On the contrary, in our contribution, we make the opposite
assumption. If we go back to prenuptial agreements, their absence can be a
credible signaling and/or screening device, if (literally) incomplete contracts
5However, see also Maskin and Tirole (1999), Tirole (1999)) in their critique to the
incomplete contract literature.
4are more costly than the complete ones. It appeared quite natural to us
assuming that incomplete contracts are more costly to implement than com-
plete ones because they imply higher litigation costs, but quite surprisingly,
to our knowledge, we are the only ones to exploit this feature. 6
After what we said, a natural question arises: is our model an incomplete
contracts one? Even though the question appears to be rather simple, it has
no easy answer. On the one hand, our contracts are literally incomplete.
On the other hand, literal incompleteness does not imply any unforeseen
contingency. In fact, parties can predict their course of action in any future
contingency and therefore in our model writing an incomplete contract is an
optimal (in the second best sense) form of contracting.7 H e n c ew el e a v et o
the reader the decision on whether our model deals with incomplete contracts
or not. However, we are convinced that our paper can provide two minor,
but important, contributions to the incomplete contract literature. In order
to explain these contribution, recall that, loosely speaking, there are two
kinds of incomplete contracts: ﬂat contracts, i.e., those specifying the same
action in diﬀerent contingencies, and those not specifying what to do in some
contingency.
Our model endogenously generates a literally incomplete contract ac-
cording to the latter sense, but it is not able to generate a ﬂat contract.
This result suggests that the two form of incompleteness might have diﬀer-
ent explanations. Current literature neglects this point, because it tries to
derive both forms of contract incompleteness by cost of complexity. The
6Focusing on litigation costs which derive from incompleteness, our paper is also linked
with the literature on the breach of contracts (e.g. Rogerson (1984), Shavell (1980)). Any-
way, this literature typically takes for granted that private contracts are incomplete and
analyzes under which conditions clauses which specify damage for breach may approxi-
mate eﬃciency. On this respects the focus of our paper is diﬀerent since we allow parties to
sign eﬃcient and complete contracts where all aspects of the divorce process are speciﬁed.
7This resembles an old idea that the absence of contigent dealings is closely related to
moral hazard and imperfect information (see, for instance Arrow (1974).
5second contribution to the general theory of incomplete contract is that lit-
eral incompleteness might matter. Also this point is not considered in the
general literature because it is assumed that literal incompleteness has no
eﬀect when renegotiation is allowed.8
Let us see why this is not the case in our model, analyzing ﬁrst the
problems induced by renegotiation. Suppose that the absence of a prenup-
tial agreement is a signaling and/or screening device, and suppose that the
equilibrium is separating, that is, agents more willing to spend eﬀort to the
beneﬁt of the partnership do not sign prenuptial agreements, while the oth-
e r sd oa n dm a r r i a g ei sb e t w e e ns p o u s e so ft h es a m et y p e .C a l lt h ef o r m e r
type of agents the high productivity (high for short) one and the latter the
low productivity (low for short) one. Then, one should expect that after
marriage high type couples sign postnuptial agreements, that is, renegotiate
the prenuptial arrangements. However, if they do so, the lack of a prenup-
tial agreement would not be a credible signal and agents’ types would not
separate. In fact, the low type agents would ﬁnd it optimal to imitate those
of the high one by not signing pre-nuptial agreements, but signing only post-
nuptial ones. Said it diﬀerently, contracts would be literally incomplete, but
they would be completed afterwards with no real eﬀects on couples.
In our model couples will not necessarily sign a post-nuptial agreement.
Intuitively, mutual distrust prevents real world couples to sign post-nuptial
agreements when they start ﬁghting. In order to model this “mutual dis-
trust” we added a second stage to the signaling one, where a moral haz-
ard problem takes place. Moreover, the absence of prenuptial agreements
worsen the moral hazard problem, since it leaves undeﬁned what has to be
considered an appropriate behavior during marriage. In this setup, for some
8See Hermalin and Katz (1993).
6parameter values and some histories of the game, the lack of a prenuptial
agreement is renegotiation proof, since the proposal of a post-nuptial one is
taken as a signal of unmonitored misbehavior of the proposer.
Another way to explain our model is to tell the same story backwards.
Spouses usually engage in common activities but they might exert diﬀerent
levels of eﬀort, which are not observable. In equilibrium, the high types
can run the risk of being expropriated of the results of their eﬀort in case of
divorce, because they have a lower probability of divorcing. On the contrary,
in equilibrium, the low type cannot.
Which are the substantive prediction of our model? First of all, our
model exhibits a (divine Bayesian-perfect) equilibrium with the coexistence
of couples who sign prenuptial agreements, who do not sign prenuptial agree-
ments, but then divorce amicably (signing a postnuptial agreement) and ﬁ-
nally couples who end their marriage by means of costly litigations in front
of a court. This result is obtained in a model with a relatively simple struc-
ture. We think it as an important feature of our model since all these cases
are observed in reality. Second, in equilibrium litigation takes place when
there is some sort of asymmetry in the production activities, i.e., when one
partner is more productive than the other.
Moreover, the model enables us to explore some issues about the (social)
optimality of prenuptial agreements. There are two main issues. The former
is about the desirability of enforceablep r e n u p t i a la g r e e m e n t s . T h el a t t e r
can be phrased in Becker’s (1998) wording: why don’t we make prenuptial
agreements mandatory, since they save considerable litigation costs?
In the paper we prove that the introduction of enforceable premarital
agreement, for speciﬁc parameter values, has no eﬀect on the rate of divorce,
namely it does not increase it, and therefore it turns out to be false one of
7the main argument against their enforceability. Proving social optimality
of enforceability is a more diﬃcult question, since without enforceability
the only possible equilibrium is a pooling one. In our model the separat-
ing equilibrium does not clearly (Pareto) dominates the pooling one, nor
viceversa.
Finally, we also proved that for some parameter values the high types
would like and are able to separate from the low types by not signing prenup-
tial agreements. Hence, if prenuptial agreements become mandatory, the
high type agents will be compelled to ﬁnd new costly ways to separate from
the low ones. Thus mandatory agreements in our model would be at best
irrelevant. Therefore, our model suggests some cautiousness in imposing the
adoption of mandatory prenuptial agreements.
In summary our model suggests that there should be no major objection
in making the prenuptial agreements enforceable, but also that there are not
good reasons to make them mandatory.
The main limitation of our model is that, in order to solve it in a rel-
atively easy way, we had to assume symmetry among agents. This implies
that we are not able to study the eﬀects of asymmetries between genders
and/or between partners in terms of wealth, kind of assets and capabilities
owned.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the bench mark
model and we present how courts rule on divorce when agents have not
drawn up divorce clauses in their marriage contracts. In Section 3 we state
our main result and in the following Section 4 generalize this result discussing
the optimal contract, proving the uniqueness of the proposed equilibrium.
In Section 5 we brieﬂy discuss some assumptions and interpretations of the
model, including its applicability to other kind of partnership, like joint
8venture and mergers. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Agents’ Model
Population is constituted by many agents, N, who live two periods and in
period 0 have a private endowment equal to 1. Each agent i can use the
private endowment as an input factor, denoted by e, to produce a durable
goodAlternatively i can enjoy the endowment as leisure, denoted by l. Hence:
ei+li ≤ 1 for each agent i ∈ N. For simplicity, let assume that ei,l i ∈ {0,1}.
We refer to the activities li and ei respectively as agent i’s leisure and
eﬀort, but we may think at them as money, time or abilities, etc., spent
respectively for private consumption or for the production of the durable
good. There exist two durable goods, G1 and G2, and each agent has to
specialize in the production of one of them. Production of the durable good
Gi ∈ {0,1} is a risky activity which depends on the eﬀort devoted by the
agent i. W ed e n o t eb yµr
ei the probability that Gi =1when agent i has
devoted eﬀort ei in the production activity, with µr
1 >µ r
0.T h e r e a r e t w o
types of agents, who diﬀer for the probability of producing successfully the




0 > 0.H e n c e t h e h i g h
type has a comparative advantage with respect to the low one in producing
the public goods. The total numbers of the high and low types are even







The meaning of this assumption will be made clear shortly below. In essence,
it ensures that unmatched agents prefer to exert eﬀort rather than enjoying
leisure. During their marriage, each agent beneﬁts of both goods produced
9by the partners: durable goods are “public goods” within the couple.9 There
is no discounting.
Agents are matched in pairs; θ is the degree of ﬁt of the partners and we
assume that it is a random variable with θ ∈ {θb,θg},w i t hθb ≤− 1,θg > 0,
E (θ) ≥ 0. The assumption that θb ≤− 1 implies that the psychological
aspects of marriages, summarized by the degree of ﬁt, are more relevant than
the economic ones. More to the point, the psychological aspects can drive
couples to divorce even when successful from a productive point of view. We
deserve this as a reasonable assumption for relationships like marriages. Let
p =P r{θ = θb}. We assume that the degree of ﬁt, θ, and the production of
the durable goods, Gi, are uncorrelated. Agents’ expected utility function
is linear and separable in all components. Given our assumptions, all agents
prefer to be matched with a high-type partner rather than with a low-type
one. If an agent decides to marry, the ex post utility function is:
ui = Gi + θ + Gj + li + ξ [θ + Gi + Gj]
+(1− ξ)[αiGi +( 1− αj)Gj − Φi]
where ξ is an indicator functions such that ξ =1if agent i has a partner
at time t =1and ξ =0otherwise; αi and (1 − αj) are respectively the
portions of good Gi and good Gj that agent i receives according to the
divorce rule (and (1 − αi) and αj are the portions of j), and Φi is the sum
of the litigation costs and monetary transfers (eventually negative) from i
to j.
The information structure of the game is as follows. The agents cannot
9For a justiﬁcation of these assumptions see for instance Weiss (2001).
10observe the degree of ﬁt θ until they marry. Agents can observe the goods
eventually produced but not the level of eﬀort. Courts (or any third party)
may costlessly observe the amount of total production, but verifying the
level of eﬀort is a costly activity. This assumption will be discussed in the
closing section. The cost of this activity is assumed to be equal to 2F.T h u s ,
going to court is a costly way to verify some pieces of information.
The timing of the game is the following. In the ﬁrst stage nature selects
high types with probability q and low ones with complementary probability.
Then each agent announces the contract that he is going to propose (“no
contract” is an admissible announcement). Writing (and reading) a contract
costs c,w h e r ec is a ﬁxed and arbitrarily small amount. Then a matching
phase starts. We will be more precise on matching later on. Namely, we will
introduce a simpliﬁed matching mechanism in the bench-mark case and a
more sophisticated one when generalizing the model. After matching, mar-
riage begins and each agent decides whether to devote eﬀort in producing
a durable, (public within the couple), good or to enjoy leisure. Nature de-
termines the degree of ﬁt of the married partners, who afterwards observe
the outcome and the level of production. Spouses simultaneously decide
whether to continue the marriage or to end it. Divorce occurs if at least
one of the partners wishes to end the marriage. In case of divorce spouses
may negotiate an ex-post agreement. We simply assume that Nature draws
up one of the two partners who is entitled to propose an ex-post agreement,
while the other can accept or refuse it. In order to maintain this simpliﬁed
bargaining structure without generating odd results, we impose that pro-
posals must guarantee to the partner at least an equal division of marital
assets and expenses. The proposer can always propose agreements which











Figure 1: Timing of the Game
Proposing (and accepting) an ex-post agreement has the same cost as
an ex-ante agreement, c. If the proposal is accepted the ex-post agreement
is enforced. On the contrary, if the proposal is rejected, spouses go to court.
We assume that both ex-ante and ex-post marriage contracts are en-
forceable. A (ex-ante) contract prescribes both some speciﬁcb e h a v i o rt h a t
agents have to follow during the relationship and how to divide the joint
production in case of divorce, eventually conditioning the sharing rule to
the prescribed actions, whenever they are veriﬁable. Given the structure of
the game, an ex-post contract may only determine a sharing rule, while a
prenuptial one can determine also the activity in which each partner has to
specialize. As mentioned above, when no contract has been drawn by the
parties, then a court decides how to divide the common assets.
Since the veriﬁcation activity is costly, going to court implies a loss of
eﬃciency. In our model spouses can avoid the cost of litigation by signing
this (complete) contract:
Deﬁnition 1 The simple contract:
1. agent 1 is in charge to producing good G1 and agent 2 is in charge to
produce good G2;
2. in case of divorce each agent receives the eventually produced good.
12Partners who sign the simple contract have no cost in divorcing and
therefore their decision (whether divorcing or not) is ex-post eﬃcient; there-
fore they always divorce when the match is bad, θ = θb,s i n c ew ea s s u m e
that θb ≤− 1. Moreover, given condition 1, the simple contract induces
agents to exert eﬀort.10
Hence, in case of complete information, i.e. in the case where agents’
types are known, spouses will write a complete contract in order to avoid
the moral hazard problem and to attain the eﬃcient outcome.
If agents decide to divorce in front of a court, then the following rules
apply.
The Court’s Rules Divorce rules adopted by courts vary among diﬀer-
ent countries and States. There are basically two regimes: (i) a “community
property” regime, which essentially means that marital property belongs
equally to the partners and in case of (no-fault) divorce it is equally shared;
(ii) an “equitable division” regime according to which the “division of jointly
owned marital property and the amount of any monetary transfer between
the partners is determined by a court in order to arrive at a fair and equi-
table solution”. 11 In this second case the marital property is not always
divided equally, and many factors, such as the contribution of each party
to the well-being of the family and to the acquisition of the marital prop-
erty, the circumstances and factors which contributed to the dissolution of
the marriage, the personal characteristics (age, mental condition) of each
partner, etc., are usually taken into account by the court. In our model
agents may diﬀer for their type and the eﬀort they exerted, but the courts
10Note that agents who sign the simple contract stricly prefer to marry rather than to
remain single.
11The Code of Virginia § 20-107.3. In US a community property regime is adopted, for
instance in Arizona, California, and Texas, but the majority of States provide for equitable
rather than equal distribution.
13may only observe this second characteristic and then equitable divorce rules
should only depend upon the levels of eﬀort. We restrict a divorce rule to
select an equal division of the property (without any monetary transfer) in
all cases where parties behaved identically, either exerting eﬀort or not ex-
erting it. In case, the parties exerted a diﬀerent level of eﬀort and an agent
used his/her own endowment for personal well-being, we require that court
adopts the rule which (i) awards the other party with a monetary compen-
sation in order to oﬀset the agent who has exerted eﬀort for the well-being
of the couple; (ii) assigns at least half of the marital asset to the agent who
exerted more eﬀort. Let k ∈ {0,1,2} be the amount of public good produced
within the couple. It follows that in case one agent exerted eﬀort and the








of the k public goods is assigned
to the agent who exerted eﬀort in production. Given that the public good
has the same monetary value for both partners, then we may express this
class of rules in a compact way. Deﬁne the transfers received by the working
and shirking partner respectively as T+
ik and T−
ik. For what said before they
are equal to:
T+
ik = skk + mk
T−
ik =( 1 − sk)k − mk




ik = βk (k +1 )
T−
ik = k − βk (k +1 )
14This second formulation is easier to use since it summarizes in a single
parameter, βk = skk+mk
k+1 ,t w oo ft h eﬁrst one, sk and mk. Therefore, the
court rule can be expressed as:
Ti =

    
    
T+
ik if ei >e −i
T−
ik if ei <e −i
1
2k if ei = e−i
Finally note that βk ≥ 1
2 for all k =0 ,1,2.
3 The Bench-Mark Case
In this section we will present the simplest version of the model, which we
call the bench-mark case (BMC). In the next section we will generalize the
results and discuss the uniqueness of the proposed equilibrium and whether
contract incompleteness is an optimal form of contracting. We ﬁrst describe
the matching mechanism which characterizes the bench-mark case.
The Matching Mechanism Each agent in the population proposes a
contract. Agents are drawn in pairs from a ballot box containing the entire
population. If both agents propose the same contract, then this contract is
going to be signed (and no contract is signed whenever both agents do not
want to sign any ex-ante contract). If agents propose diﬀerent contracts,
then agents are put again in the ballot and new pairwise extractions are
made. Pairs are sequentially drawn and agents do not know how many
pairs were drawn before them. Matching is in logic time and ends when all
the remaining agents were already matched with all the others left in the
ballot.
153.1 A Training Example: No-Renegotiation and No Moral
Hazard.
We provide now a simpliﬁed example which may help in understanding our
r e s u l t s .F i r s to fa l l ,w ei m p o s et h a ta l lp a r t n e r sw i l le x e r te ﬀort. Therefore
the moral hazard problem during marriage cannot takes place. Second, we
do not allow for renegotiation, namely, no postnuptial agreement can be
signed. These assumptions will be removed in the general model, when we
allow for renegotiation between partners. Since all partners exert eﬀort in
the production activities, then in case of divorce in front of a court, the
marital asset will be always equally shared. Second, we assume that
1
2
> −θb − F>0 (2)
where F is the cost of litigation12. Assumption 2 implies that those partners
who do not sign a prenuptial agreement (and therefore have to face a costly
litigation) divorce if and only if there was a bad match and no agent produced
successfully the public good.
We show that, for some parameters value, there exists a separating equi-
librium where all couples are formed by agents of the same type, high-type
agents do not write premarital agreements and low-type agents do sign the
simple contract of Deﬁnition 1. Moreover high-type agents divorce when
θ = θb and no agent produced, low-type agents divorce whenever θ = θb,a s
it was argued when the simple strategy was introduced. Therefore the di-
vorcing decision of the low type is ex-post eﬃcient, while high-type partners
suﬀer ineﬃcient continuation of marriage when at least one public good is
12In this example F is not the cost of veriﬁcation, but some other kind of legal costs,
as the costs for legal advice, etc.
16produced, due to the presence of the litigation costs.13





































(θb +1 )− (1 − µh
1)2F
where the ﬁrst line is the expected utility of period one, the second line is
the expected utility in period two in case the match is good, and the third
line is the expected utility in period two in case the match is bad.
To provide a numerical example, let assume that p = 1
2, −θb = 4
3,θ g =2
(so that E(θ)=1
3), c =0(writing a contract is costless), (half of) the





4. Substituting these numbers in the previous formula,
we obtain the high type agent’s equilibrium expected utility level: 1
3 +3 .
928.
If the high-type agent deviates and joins a low-type partner, then she
obtains an expected utility level equal to 1
3 +3 .925 14,w h i c hc o m p a r e d
to the equilibrium expected utility level guarantees that the self-selection
constraint for the high-type is satisﬁed.
For the same parameter values and with analogous formula as those for
the high type, in equilibrium the low type has an expected utility equal to:
13We will prove in the general case that this feature of the model disappears if we allow
for renegotiation: hence there will be no ineﬃcient divorce decision.


















3 +3.625, while if he deviates joining a high-type, he obtains a utility level
equal to: 1
3 +3 .62. It follows that also the self-selection constraint of the
low-type is satisﬁed.
3.2 Results with Renegotiation and Moral Hazard
Let us come back to the more general formulation of the model. The lack
of enforceability of postmarital agreements is hard to support both from a
theoretical point of view and in practical terms, since in many legislations
where premarital agreements are enforceable, ex-post marital agreement are
enforceable too. If agents may write ex-post enforceable agreements, the
previous equilibrium (outcome) does not survive if there is no moral hazard
problem during marriage. 15
Consider the case where the level of production is equal to one and
θ = θb in the example of the previous section. In equilibrium a high-type
agent remains married in the second period and her utility is equal to −1
3;
this agent would obtain a greater utility oﬀering to the partner to equally
divide the marital asset in order to divorce amicably. Moreover, accepting
the oﬀer is a dominant strategy for the partner.
In the general model, however, provided that some conditions are satis-
ﬁed, there exists a Bayesian perfect separating equilibrium where all part-
nerships are formed by agents of the same type. High-type agents propose
to the selected partner to sign “no contract”, low-type agents propose to
sign the simple contract of deﬁnition 1. In equilibrium all agents exert the
eﬃcient level of eﬀort: low-type because the simple contract guarantees the
15In some legislations post-marital agreements are enforceable if they are signed some
years before a partner starts the divorce procedure. In our model we do not make any
distinction between postmarital agreement and amicable divorce. The only relevant dis-
tinction is whether the ex-post agreeement is proposed before or after the eﬀort is exerted.
Here we concentrate in the second case and we brieﬂyd i s c u s st h eﬁrst in the ﬁnal section,
given that our results do not change.
18right incentive in order for the spouses to exert eﬀort, high-type agents since
the probability of adversarial divorces is positive and courts are going to pun-
ish the cheating spouse. Hence, in equilibrium the moral hazard problem is
solved. Since in equilibrium all agents do exert the maximal level of eﬀort,
litigation in a world of symmetric information would never occur. Neverthe-
less, high-type agents choose not to complete their contracts in some states
of the world. In fact, we prove that when renegotiation is admissible and
both partners had the same productivity (either 0 or 1) they divorce am-
icably, but when one partner was productive and the other was not they
end their marriage in front of a court. Ineﬃcient litigation is the result of a
signaling game. Players who propose an ex-post agreement signal something
about their behavior during the relationship. When only one public good
was produced, the receivers assign probability 1 that the proposer of an ex-
post agreement has exerted zero eﬀort. Given this belief it is optimal for
the receiver to refuse the renegotiation proposal, because the court will force
the partner to compensate for the misconduct. Finally, in our equilibrium
all marriages end when the match is bad: there is no ineﬃcient continuation
of marriage.
Proposition 1 There exist upper and lower bounds on F, the litigation
costs, and on µh
1 and µl
1, the types’ productivities, (conditions (C) of the
appendix), for which there exists a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium
such that:
1) all marriages are formed by agents of the same type;
2) all agents exert the eﬃcient level of eﬀort;
3) high-type agents do not sign any contract;
4) low-type agents sign the simple contract and therefore never incur in lit-
igation costs.
195) all couples divorce when θ = θb (the degree of ﬁt is negative);
6) there will be a postnuptial agreement when high-type partners decide to
divorce and (i) no good was produced, or (ii) both goods were produced;
7) high-type partner face costly litigation if only one of the two high-type
partners produced the public good (and θ = θb);
8) when only one good was produced, high-type agents who receive an ex-post
agreement proposal will believe with probability one that the partner shirked
and consequently refuse it; therefore, nobody will propose an ex-post agree-
ment.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The separating equilibrium does exist since for high-type agents the gain
of joining with a high-productivity partner is greater then the expected
cost of facing a contentious divorce, while the opposite holds true for low-
types agents. This occurs since the ex-ante probability to face a contentious
divorce for a deviating low type who joins a high type is greater than the
probability of a costly divorce for a high-type agent in equilibrium.
Conditions (C) is described in details in the appendix. However, the
conditions ﬁx lower and upper bounds on the litigation costs F, on the low
types’ productivity, µl
1, and a lower bound on the high types’ productivity,
µh
1.I n f a c t , i f F is very low, the threat of costly litigation when no pre-
marital agreement is signed is not strong enough to induce low type agents
to separate and hence to sign contracts containing divorce clauses. On the
contrary, if litigation costs are very high, then, in case the marriage ends, all
agents who did not sign divorce clauses, will write an agreement just before
going to the court. In this case contract incompleteness cannot be a credible
threat of costly litigation.
Bounds on µh
1 and µl






. The diﬀerence in productivity of the two types can be thought
of as the gain (loss) in separation for a high (low) type. Therefore the upper






are the mirror images of those on F and
have the same interpretation.
The equilibrium of Proposition 1 is sustained by a speciﬁc out-of-equilibrium
belief. That is, if a partner receives an ex-post negotiation proposal and the
total production is equal to one, he assigns probability one that the proposer
shirked. This belief does imply that agents who exerted eﬀort do not make
any proposal when the production is equal to one and the match is bad. The
next goal of this section is to show that this belief is the only one satisfying
the weakest of the divinity criteria: the D1 criterion.
We will not deﬁne the D1 criterion formally. Its intuition is as follows.
Suppose that one player is observed deviating from the equilibrium and that
there are two diﬀerent types of that player, types 1 and 0. Moreover, suppose
that any belief that the deviating player might held, induces 0 to deviate
whenever it induces 1 to do so, but not the opposite. That is, there are
beliefs that induce 0 to deviate, but not 1. Then, according to D1, we must
assign probability zero that the deviating player is of type 1.
Proposition 2 For any positive, arbitrarily small, cost of proposing an ex-











then only the equilibrium beliefs of Proposition 1 satisfy the D1 criterion,
that is, the counterpart infers that the proposer shirked with probability 1 if
only one public good was produced.
Proof. See the Appendix
The intuition of this proposition is the following. Agents who have not
21exerted eﬀort are more prone to renegotiate since in case of litigation in
front of a court they incur in the penalty that the court inﬂicts to shirking
agent. For this reason an agent infers that the partner has shirked in case
she receives an agreement proposal. Finally, in order to assign a positive
probability to the fact the proposer did not exert eﬀort, it must be the case
that shirking is not a dominated strategy, as condition (3) guarantees.
Remark 1 We assumed that both agents simultaneously choose to divorce,
if θ = θb, before negotiating the divorce. Our argument still holds if we
assumed that the proposer may also propose to continue the marriage. In
this case, the equilibrium beliefs should assign probability 1 that the partner
who proposes to continue the marriage is a shirker.
Proof. See the Appendix
Finally, it is worth noticing that this proposition easily extends also to
the generalized version of the model, which we are going to present.
4 Optimal Incomplete Contracts
In this section we want to prove that literally incomplete contracts not only
arise as an equilibrium phenomenon, but they may be an optimal form of
contracting. In order to prove this result, we have to modify the structure of
the game in order to allow agents to sign any type of contract, possibly with
a private arbitrator who can eventually enforce a contract implementing the
same outcome as that described in the previous section. Thus, if partners can
ﬁnd a Pareto improvement with respect to the outcome of that equilibrium,
they will choose it and we should not observe literal incomplete contracts
in equilibrium. To this end, we have to generalize the matching stage, since
22each agent must have the chance to propose any type of contract to the
potential partners without bearing the risk of remaining unmarried.
The Generalized Matching Mechanism Each agent proposes a con-
tract (“no contract” is an admissible announcement) and describes the set of
acceptable contracts (which has to contain the proposed contract). Agents
are drawn in pairs from a ballot box containing the entire population. If
both agents propose the same contract, then this contract is going to be
signed (and no contract is signed whenever both agents do not want to sign
any ex-ante contract). If agents propose diﬀerent contracts, but they are
both acceptable for the other, then one of these contracts is randomly cho-
sen and signed. If only one of the contracts is acceptable for the other, then
it is signed. If none of the previous cases occurs, then agents are put again
in the ballot and new pairwise extractions are made according to the same
rules as the previous matching mechanism.
4.1 Results
We assume that in equilibrium all agents accept to sign all contracts which
guarantee them the same expected utility level than that provided by the
contract they sign in the proposed equilibrium. It follows that whenever
there exists any (literally) complete contract which guarantees a higher-
utility to high-type agents, then contract incompleteness should not arise
in equilibrium. In Remark 3 of the appendix we show how the equilibrium
described in Proposition 1 has to be modiﬁed in order to take into account
the new set-up.
We proceed now in the following way. First we show that there is no
separating complete contract which guarantees to high-type agents a higher
23payoﬀ than that of the BMC equilibrium. Hence, we are able to prove that
a contract with missing clauses is the optimal separating contract, because
the high types are in their ﬁrst best contract provided they are separated.
Finally, we provide suﬃcient conditions for our equilibrium to guarantee the
highest utility to high-type agents, when we consider pooling equilibria too.
4.1.1 Separating Contracts without Third Parties
As before, we restrict our attention to symmetric contracts. Moreover, since
we look at contracts without any arbitration and we allow for renegotiation,
in equilibrium we cannot have contracts where there is waste of resources.
To be more speciﬁc, we do not allow, for instance, contracts which contain
clauses imposing to destroy part of the joint production in case of divorce.
Hence, the only complete contracts which may succeed in separating types
are those which “punish” the agent that was ex-post not productive. Since
the productivity of the two types is diﬀerent, an appropriate punishment can
deter low-type agents from signing contracts with high-type partners. To
summarize, a symmetric complete separating contract without arbitration:
a.s p e c i ﬁes which good each agent has to produce and
b.i m p o s e s a p e n a l t y P ≥ 0 to the non-productive agent which has to be
paid to the counterpart, when only one agent produced and spouses decide
to divorce.






then high-type agents prefer the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 to
any separating contract without arbitration.
24Proof. See appendix
The intuition of the restrictions on θg in previous Proposition 3 is the
following. If P ≤ θg, then the contract would provide the ﬁr s tb e s to u t c o m e
for high-types. However, when P ≤ θg ≤
(2−p)
p there is no “punishment”
which may induce low-type to separate, because the expected gain in having
a more productive partner is greater than the expected loss of paying this
partner when he only had success in producing. If P>θ g punishment may
be large enough to deter low types from signing these contracts. In this case,
however, the productive partner wishes to divorce even when the match is
good, if she is the only productive agent, in order to receive P. Therefore,
when θg ≥
4pβ1−1
2(1−p) the expected loss due to ineﬃcient divorce for a pair of
high-partners who sign a complete contract, is larger than their expected
cost of litigation when they do not write any contract.
4.1.2 Separating Contracts with Third Parties
We consider here contracts where a third party (an arbitrator) is involved.
Contracts with arbitrator are used in order to ascertain the state of the
world and therefore it is natural to assume that cost of veriﬁcation for the
arbitrator is at least 2F,t h es t a t ev e r i ﬁcation cost for the court. More-
over, we assume that any contract can be renegotiated by the two parties
before the actual decision of divorcing. This assumption seems to us consis-
tent with the framework used in the bench-mark case, where partners can
sign ex-post agreement before divorcing. The assumption of renegotiability
simply implies that the amount of transfers to the arbitrator in case both
agents exerted eﬀort (as it occurs in equilibrium!) has to be at most equal
to 2F. Any contract that provides for a higher payment to the arbitrator
will be renegotiate before divorcing. Therefore, as in the case without ar-
25bitrator, parties cannot destroy resources in equilibrium. Nevertheless, we
allow parties to write premarital agreements which provide for speciﬁca c -
tions within the marriage (and not onlyi nc a s eo fd i v o r c e ) . I np a r t i c u l a r ,
we allow contracts with costly state veriﬁcation without divorcing. Under
these assumptions we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If conditions (C) of the appendix hold, then the high-type
agents prefer the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 to any other sepa-
rating contract with arbitrator, provided that costs of state veriﬁcation for
the latter are at least 2F, c is arbitrarily small and 0.36 ≤ p ≤ 0.5.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition of Proposition 4 is the following. Contracts which call
for state veriﬁcation by means of a third party are more costly than the
incomplete contract, except in one case, that is when the contract with
arbitrator calls for state veriﬁcation only when no good were produced.
Nevertheless, in this case if the probability of divorcing is higher than 0.36,
then the transfer that should be paid to the arbitrator in order to induce the
low type to not sign this contract, has to be higher than the upper bound on
F, ¯ F, allowed according to conditions (C). However, renegotiation proofness
forces the payment to be equal F, thus inducing the result that no separating
equilibrium does exist for the relevant set of parameter values. Finally, the
condition p ≤ 1
2 guarantees that all contracts which call for state veriﬁcation
when the match is good or for both levels of matches are more costly that
the contracts which call for state veriﬁcation when the match is bad.
4.1.3 The Pooling Equilibria.
Let us assume that a pooling equilibrium does exist. The utility level for
each agent in this pooling equilibrium depends upon the probability to marry
26a high-type partner. If q tends to zero, i.e., there are few high-type agents
in the population, then the high-type agent utility level tends exactly to his
payoﬀ when he deviates and marries a low-type partner in the separating
equilibrium of Proposition 1. It follows that, at least for q suﬃciently small
or equivalently for a suﬃciently high ratio, 1−q,o ft h el o w - t y p e ,h i g h - t y p e
payoﬀ in the (eﬃcient) pooling equilibrium is lower than their payoﬀ in the
separating equilibrium. But then it is easy to show that high-type agents
a r ea b l et os e p a r a t ef r o ml o w - t y p ea g e n t sd r a w i n gu pd i ﬀerent contracts,
namely choosing a complete contract which mimics the outcome of the BMC
equilibrium described in the previous sections.
Corollary 1 If conditions (C) of the Appendix hold,
4pβ1−1
2(1−p) ≤ θg ≤
(2−p)
p ,
0.36 ≤ p ≤ 0.5, q is not too big, state veriﬁcation is at least as costly for
any arbitrator than for courts, then there exist no equilibrium which ensures
a higher expected utility to high type than the separating equilibrium with no
premarital contracts.
Proof. It is a direct consequence of the above discussion and all previous
propositions.
4.1.4 Enforceability of Premarital Contracts
In this paper we assumed that premarital agreements were enforceable. It
might be argued that allowing couples to sign enforceable prenuptial con-
tracts would increase the rate of divorce.16 We are able to prove that in our
setting couples who sign a premarital agreement divorce at the same rate as
couples who do not sign any agreement.
16This increase could bring an eﬃciency loss whenever the social costs of divorces are
higher than the private gains from separation.
27In our model there does not exist any other costs of divorcing apart from
the litigation costs. Therefore couples who sign a premarital agreement,
setting to zero the litigation costs, always divorce eﬃciently. If θ = θb < −1
and partners did not divorce in equilibrium, then we would observe ineﬃcient
divorcing.17
Ineﬃcient divorcing may occurs only if both the two following conditions
hold: (i) the cost of litigations are higher than the costs of remaining mar-
ried; (ii) any proposal to reach an ex-post agreement in order to avoid the
litigation costs would be rejected by the partner. Let focus on condition
(ii). Condition (ii) implies that a partner who receives the proposal of an
amicable agreement assigns positive probability to the fact that the proposer
did not exert eﬀort. We prove that there exists at least a proposal, namely
the “fair” proposal (each partner receives 1
2k), such that the unique beliefs
which satisfy the D1 criterion assign zero probability to the fact that the
proposer has shirked. Intuitively, if no proposal is made, partners continue
their relationship. Hence, if such an equilibrium existed, the equilibrium
payoﬀ is the same both for shirkers and non-shirkers. On the contrary, the
risk of deviating and making a proposal is higher for the agent who did
not exert eﬀort, since in case of rejection the court is going to punish the
shirking proposer.
Proposition 5 All perfect Bayesian equilibria which satisfy the D1 crite-
rion induce eﬃcient divorcing in equilibrium, if c is suﬃciently small.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition implies the following remark.
Remark 2 If ex-post amicable agreements are allowed and the cost of writ-
17If −θb =1and both partners have produced, then to remain married is Pareto eﬃcient.
28ing a contract, c, is small, then the introduction in the legislation of enforce-
able premarital agreements has no eﬀect on the rate of divorce.
5 Discussion and Interpretation
Existence of other type of equilibria.W ep r o v et h ee x i s t e n c eo ft h es e p a r a t i n g
equilibrium where partners who did not sign a premarital agreement litigate
in front of a court only when the total production is equal to one. It may be
proved that there are other separating equilibria in which high-type partners
do not sign premarital agreeements. Namely, there exist a separating equi-
librium where partners litigate if and only if the total production is less than
two, and another one where they litigate only when the total production is
equal to zero. In the proof of Proposition 4 we compare these equilibria with
the equilibrium of Proposition 1: the ﬁrst equilibrium is clearly Pareto dom-
inated, while the second equilibrium may be proved to exist for a diﬀerent
set of parameters values. We chose to focus only on one equilibrium to keep
the exposition as simple as we could. We picked the equilibrium in which
we observe litigation when the production is asymmetric simply because we
believe it more realistic.
Joint Production. In our model there is no joint production, but only
joint consumption. We do not assume joint production in order to make the
complete eﬃcient contract as simple as possible; so that in our model the
lack of prenuptial agreements clearly does not depend on any form of com-
plexity costs. Notice, however, that in our model the crucial assumptions
a r et h a tp a r t n e r sh a v ed i ﬀerent activities and that those activities result
in diﬀerent products. For instance if partners were involved with diﬀerent
roles in two joint production processes with two diﬀerent outputs, our model
would need minor modiﬁcations (the most important being that the endow-
29ment should be used in three diﬀerent activities: leisure, production process
1 and production process 2).
Other Forms of Partnerships. The ﬁeld of application of this model is
mainly (pre- and post-) nuptial agreements. There are area where we observe
similar phenomena. For instance, in the merger between Time-Warner and
AOL a few analysts were concerned about the absence of de-merger clauses.
It is possible that this absence could be explained by similar arguments as
those developed in this paper, however we feel that in this case signaling
consideration to third parties (i.e. the ﬁnancial market operators) might be
at least as important as the former. In fact, it is possible that the inclusion
of de-merger clauses could be interpreted by the market as low level of
trust on the economic eﬃciency of merger by the parties themselves, thus
inducing higher ﬁnancial costs. However, we think that relevant examples
in the research joint venture literature can be found.
Matching. We restricted ourselves to matching rules which prevent
agents from remaining unmatched. In fact, we were interested in analyzing
how partners contract over their divorce and how diﬀerent contracts aﬀect
the ex-post probability of divorce, while we were not concerned about how
the divorcing decision aﬀects the ex-ante probability to marry. However,
we conjecture that generalizing the model would not change the qualitative
results.
Renegotiation. In the model agents may complete their contracts after
having observed the outcome, and therefore when they already exerted the
eﬀort. High-type agents reject any proposal in the renegotiation stage since
they believe that the partner who makes a proposal did not exert eﬀort.
What does it happen if we allow agents to complete the contract at time
0, before eﬀort is exerted? Let us consider a game where at time zero an
30agent may ask to complete the contract to the partner, but, consistently
with this assumption, the partner may accept or reject the proposal. If
she rejects, she can then decide whether to continue the marriage or to
divorce in order to marry with a diﬀerent partner. It is easy to show that
our main argument still holds. There exists a separating equilibrium where
high-type agents reject the proposal to complete the contract since they
believe with probability one that the partner who makes the proposal is a
low-type. Moreover, (after rejection) they divorce in order to ﬁnd a new
partner. One can also check that these beliefs are the only one to satisfy
the D1 criterion. In fact, a deviating low-type is going to face litigation
with higher probability than a high type in equilibrium. Therefore he is
more prone to renegotiate the incomplete contract which is costly in case of
divorce.
Bargaining. The bargaining structure deserves some justiﬁcations, be-
cause that on the ex-ante agreement is simultaneous, while that about the
ex-post one is sequential. First of all, we feel that sequential bargaining is
the correct stylized way of modeling an informal bargaining. Second, it is
rather easy to prove that even if we assumed sequential bargaining in the ex-
ante stage, nothing substantial would change to the proposed equilibrium.
In the renegotiation stage we use a sequential bargaining with restrictions
on the admissible proposals in order to avoid that the proposer has all the
bargaining power. Alternatively we could assume that agents bargain se-
quentially and iteratively (àl aRubinstein) in the renegotiation stage. We
think that this assumption may considerably increase the complexity of the
model without adding fundamental elements to our analysis.
T h eR o l eo ft h eC o u r t . A particularly relevant issue is whether this
contract incompleteness depends crucially on the court’s rule. Courts, in
31fact, could implement very diﬀerent (and odd) rules. Consider the follow-
ing: in case partners exerted diﬀerent level of eﬀort, assign all the assets
to the partner who shirked and impose to the keen partner the payment of
the entire amount of litigation costs 2F. This rule would generate a (pool-
ing) equilibrium with complete contracts. Alternatively, as some authors
suggested (See Becker (1998)), premarital agreements could be mandatory.
Nevertheless, we proved in the previous section that if high-type agents are
“sophisticated” enough, for speciﬁc parameter values, they would separate
by writing a premarital agreement with an arbitrator which mimics the sep-
arating contract. Therefore, there is no gain in eﬃciency in having a court
which applies diﬀerent rules with respect to those we stated, or in making
premarital agreements mandatory.
Moreover, we assume that courts may verify how agents use their initial
endowment (eﬀort). This seems to us a reasonable assumption, since courts
have coercive and mandatory power and they can inspect bank accounts,
call a third party as a witness , etc.. On the contrary, we do not assume
that courts may verify which good each agent actually produced. In this
paper, the production technology is a “black box” for courts, which can
only observe the individual inputs and the total output. We think that this
feature of the model is a relevant one and that it would be even more so, if
we assumed some form of joint production.
In this model, using courts instead of private arbitrators saves writing costs
of contracts. However, there might be other reasons to prefer courts to
private arbitrators. For instance, the veriﬁcation technology (which in our
setting determines the litigations costs) may present increasing return to
scale, so that a centralized institution (a court) is more eﬃcient than private
32arbitrators18;a n o t h e rj u s t i ﬁcation is that private arbitrators may be more
prone to collusive agreements with one of the party than a court. Such
consideration is even more relevant if we introduce some form of asymmetry
between the parties, which seems an important issue, since it is reasonable
to assume that a court protects the weakest party more eﬃciently than a
private arbitrator.
18It worths noticing that in our framework courts have to be eﬃcient, as far as it regards
the cost of veriﬁcation, but not too much. In fact if courts are “too eﬃcient” and are able
to verify agents’ eﬀort without no costs, high-type agents will prefer to draw up contracts
which provide for private coslty arbitration, in order to maintain positive costs of divorce.
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We present formally the conditions for which Proposition 1 holds, which



















































1) + c,2β1 − 1
2
¶
Now we state a precise version of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium whose
main features are brieﬂy mentioned in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1b: If conditions C hold, then the following perfect Bayesian
equilibrium exists:
High-type agents:
1) announce to sign no contract;
2) exert the eﬃcient level of eﬀort ei =1 ;
3) choose to divorce if θ = θb;
4) in case of divorce and the partner is the proposer of the ex-post agreement:
4.1) if they exerted eﬀort they accept only proposals such that they receive a
total transfer of at least 2β1, if only one good was produced;
4.2) if they exerted eﬀort they accept any equal division proposal when either
b o t hg o o d sw e r ep r o d u c e do rn og o o dw a sp r o d u c e d ;
4.3) if they shirked they accept any proposal such that they pay at most a
total transfer of 2β1 to the partner;
5) in case of divorce and if they are the proposers of the ex-post agreement:
5.1) they propose an equal division if either both goods were produced or no
good were produced;
5.2) if they exerted eﬀort they do not make any proposal if only one good
was produced;
5.3) if they shirked they oﬀer to pay a total transfer of 2β1 to the partner
if only one good was produced;
Low-type agents:
1) announce to sign the simple contract as from Deﬁnition 1;
19Note for the referees.I naﬁnal version the appendix can be shortened considerably,
skipping algebraic passages.
362) exert the eﬃcient level of eﬀort ei =1 ;
3) behave as high type agents both in the decision about divorcing and in the
renegotiation stage, whenever no complete contract was drawn.
If an agent proposes a premarital contract, the partner assumes with prob-
ability 1 that the proposer is a low-type. In case of divorce and only one
good was produced, if partner j proposes an ex-post agreement, then agent i
has beliefs which assign probability 1 that agent j exerted zero eﬀort. If no
good was produced or two goods were produced and if partner j proposes an
ex-post agreement, then i believes that agent j exerted eﬀort. These are the
only relevant beliefs.























































which is equivalent to:
E [θ]+(4− p)µh


































































+ θg (1 − p) − pµl
1 − c (5)
Note that a high-type agent who joins a low-type one will surely choose























37A high-type which joins a high-type partner, but who deviates and chooses




























































































Hence, the incentive compatibility constraint for the high-type is satisﬁed









































2 by assumption (1) and given that c is arbitrarily small




























which is certainly satisﬁed since β1 ≥ 1
2.



































which after easy calculation becomes:
E [θ]+( 4− p)µl
1 + θg (1 − p) − c (7)











































































































































































































Now we have to check which is the best deviation for a low-type agent. After










































Since we assumed that µl
1 −µl
0 ≥ 1
2, and given tht c is small we can assume
















































































It follows that the self-selection constraint for the low type is satisﬁed if







































































(11) and (12) prove condition C.3 Note that Condition (12) guarantees that
the lower bound of Condition (11) is not greater than 2β1− 1
2. In fact, when
only one good was produced and the level of match is bad each partner
obtains an equilibrium utility level equal to 1
2 − F. The receiver will accept
proposals which assign to him at least 2β1. If making such a proposal would
guarantee to the proposer at least the equilibrium utility, he would make
40such a proposal; hence, we must impose: 1 − 2β1 < 1
2 − F, which implies




































































Provided that the numerator is positive, which is the case iﬀ:
µh
1 ≥
1+( 1− p)c +
q
(1 − p)
2 c2 +( 3 p − 2 − p2)c +1
(4 − p)
Condition (12) can be rewritten as:
³




































































































































































Note that the derivative is positive since 1 >µ h
1 ≥ 1
2 and 1

























































1+( 1− p)c +
q
(1 − p)
2 c2 +( 3 p − 2 − p2)c +1
4 − p
With this we prove C.1. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : Suppose i has to make a proposal and suppose
that ei =1 . Denoted with π the probability that the partner will accept the
proposal and with α being the net transfer received by i, i will propose an











Note ﬁrst that the previous inequality cannot be satisﬁed if α ≤ c + 1
2 − F.
To propose such an agreement is, in fact, a dominated strategy for any agent
who exerted eﬀort. If instead ei =0and denoted with π0 the probability that





(−2F − 2β1 +1 )− c ≥− 2F − 2β1 +1 (15)
Notice that (15) can be satisﬁed even for α ≤ c+ 1
2 −F. Hence, for this set
of contract proposals the proposition is already proved, since the intuitive
criterion is suﬃcient. If α>c+ 1
2 − F, after simple manipulation we can






while (15) is satisﬁed if:
π0 ≥
c
α +2 F +2 β1 − 1
= π0
Noticing that 2β1 − 1 ≥ 0, it is easy to check that π0 <πfor any value of
α>c+ 1
2 − F. Hence there exists a larger set of conjectures that i might
hold that induces i to deviate when ei =0with respect to when ei =1 .
Hence for the D1 criterion the partner should assign 0 probability to the
fact that ei =1 .
Finally, we want to provide a condition such that shirking is not a (weakly)
dominated strategy, otherwise, by the intuitive criterion, any agent should
assign zero probability that a proposer of an amicable agreement shirked.
Suppose that partners never go to courts, and they always agree on equally
dividing their assets in case of divorce. The utility of a high-type agent who





















while the utility of a high-type agent who exerts eﬀort in the production of




























which is implied by condition (3) in the text. ¥
Proof of Remark 1: Beliefs which assign probability 1 that the partner
43who proposes to continue the marriage is a shirker are the only one satisfying
the D1 criterion, as it can be easily checked by setting α = θb+1 in equations
(14) and (15).
Remark 3 The statement of Proposition 1b has to be changed slightly when
considering the matching mechanism of section 4. In fact both to the high
type and to the low type we have to add the following move:
2b) in the matching stage they accept any contract which guarantees them
at least the same expected utility as they receive in equilibrium.
Moreover, we have to modify the equilibrium beliefs in the following way:
In the matching stage if an agent proposes a contract which does not guaran-
tee to the partner the same expected utility than no-contracting, the partner
a s s u m e sw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1t h a tt h ep r o p o s e ri sal o w - t y p e .
All the rest of the equilibrium description remains unchanged.
Proof of Proposition 3. In order to prove the statement we consider two
diﬀerent cases: the ﬁrst when P ≤ θg, the second when the opposite holds.
Case 1. (P ≤ θg) . In this case all marriages end if and only if θ = θb. In
this case, the expected payoﬀ for the high-type agents is the same as under
complete information and complete contract. In fact, the expected payoﬀ














































which is equivalent to:
E [θ]+2 µh







Note, in fact, that P does not aﬀect the utility level of high-type agents, due
to the symmetric structure of the contract. It follows that whenever this
contract is able to sustain a separating equilibrium, high-type agents strictly
prefer to sign this contract than not signing any contract. We show under
which conditions this contract cannot sustain a separating equilibrium. The





















































44which is equivalent to:



















The expected payoﬀ for a low-type who joins a low-type (and sign a simple
contract) is:
E [θ]+( 4− p)µl
1 + θg (1 − p) − c (19)
It follows that a contract without costly veriﬁcation cannot sustain a sepa-



















− (4 − p)µl
1 ≥ 0
Since P does not enter in the expected payoﬀ of the high-type agents who
signs the complete separating contract but it represents the punishment for
a deviating low-type, then it is optimal for high-type agents to ﬁxi ta tt h e


























Case 2. (P>θ g). In this case high type agents divorce (i) when θ = θb,
(ii) when θ = θg and only one partner produced the good. In fact, in the
last case, the productive partner prefers to receive P by the partner than
continuing the marriage. The utility level of a high-type agent is
E [θ]+2 µh





























45which is equivalent to
E [θ]+2 µh





















As we previously calculated, the utility of a high-type agent who does not
sign any contract is:
E [θ]+( 4− p)µh







Therefore to sign no contract guarantees a higher utility to high-type agents








((1 − p)(1+2θg) − 2pF)+c ≥ 0
Since conditions (C) guarantee that F ≤ 2β1 − 1
2,as u ﬃcient condition for





Conditions (20) and (23) together prove the proposition. Since 1
2 ≤ β1 ≤ 1,
it is easy to check that the set deﬁned by (20) and (23) is non-empty iﬀ:
0 ≤ p ≤
p








P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . The more general form of complete contract
should impose to partners diﬀerent payments for diﬀerent levels of produc-
tion. Therefore, in equilibrium we should observe the following levels of
transfers: T2, T10, T01 and T0,w h e r eT2 is the transfer of the player (to
the partner and/or to the arbitrator), which may be negative, when both
partners produced, T10 is the transfer paid by the productive partner when
the other did not produced, T01 is the transfer of the unproductive partner
when the other produced and T0 is the transfer when nobody produced.20
All equilibrium transfers assume that both partners exerted eﬀort, since no-
eﬀort should not be observed in equilibrium. In fact, the contract may call
20We impose that in no state of the world the arbitrator makes (positive) transfer to the
couples, i.e., the sum of the partners’ transfers has to be positive. Otherwise, we might
observe collusive behavior of the partners, in particular strategic divorcing. Therefore
we implicitely assume that the arbitrator cannot monitor partners after divorce and that
partners are able to apparently separate, still both beneﬁting of their joint production.
46for transfers in case one or both partners did not exert eﬀort, but these
transfers are not going to aﬀect the agents’ payoﬀ in equilibrium. A con-
tract may imply costly state veriﬁcation for all levels of production, or only
when the production is below a certain level; moreover, it can call for state
veriﬁcation if the level of match is bad, good, or in both cases.
An important observation that we are going to use frequently in the proof
is the following. Suppose that we are able to prove that a contract which
provides for state veriﬁcation for some levels of production only when a bad
match did occurs is more costly than not signing a contract. The same
result, then, follows for a contract which provides for state veriﬁcation for
the same levels of production and when a good match (or both levels of
match) did realize. In fact, imposing state veriﬁcation when the match is
good or for both levels of match, makes state veriﬁcation more likely (and
therefore the contract more costly) when p ≤ 1
2.
Case 1:w ec o n s i d e rﬁrst the case when state veriﬁcation is required for all
levels of production (and θ = θb). The high-type agent utility in equilibrium
is:
E [θ]+( 4− p)µh
1 + θg (1 − p) − (24)
p
³
µh (1 − µh)T10 +( 1− µh)µhT01 +( 1− µh)




Notice that the participation constraint of the arbitrator in a symmetric
scheme implies Tk ≥ F,w i t hk =0 ,2 and T10 + T01 ≥ 2F, whenever state
veriﬁcation is required.
Comparing (4) with (24) of the Appendix, we have that the utility for the



































































where the ﬁrst inequality is algebra and the second comes from the assump-
tion that partners have to pay the state veriﬁcation costs to the arbitrator.
But this last inequality contradicts (25).
Case 2: Now we consider contracts where partners ask for state veriﬁcation
only in some state of the world. Clearly, a contract which provides for costly
47state veriﬁcation when only one agent produced successfully is equivalent to
the BMC equilibrium except for the cost of writing the contract. More-
over all contracts which call for costly veriﬁcation when the level of total
production is zero and one, or one and two, are even more costly.
Consider now contracts which call for state veriﬁcation if the production

















Notice that renegotiation implies that parties would renegotiate any Tk >F,
k =0 ,2. In fact state veriﬁcation is a way to solve the moral hazard problem.
Therefore, partners will minimize expenses when both provided eﬀort. Thus,
Tk = F, k =0 ,2, if partners ask for state veriﬁcation, otherwise Tk =0 .I t
















since by assumption µh
1 > 1
2. Therefore we may focus on contracts which
call for costly state veriﬁcation only if either both partners produced or no
partner produced successfully.
Let consider ﬁrst the case when costly state veriﬁcation only when both
partners were productive (and θ = θb, where we exclude veriﬁcation for θg,
because more costly). The utility for the high types is higher in the BMC














It is easy to check that a suﬃcient condition is µh
1 ≥ 2
3 which is guaranteed
by conditions C (in fact we have M
¯
≥ 2
3 for β1 ≤ 1).
Let ﬁnally consider the case when state veriﬁcation occurs if no partner was
productive. We will prove that in (C) the self selection constraint of the low
t y p ec a n n o tb es a t i s ﬁed. To this end it is suﬃcient to prove that it is not
satisﬁed when state veriﬁcation occurs for all levels of match, since any other
level of veriﬁcation will implement separation among types for a smaller set
of parameter values. First, we assume that partners sign a contract with
the same clauses as the simple contract, except in the case when there is
no production. In this case each agent pay T0 if both partner have exerted
eﬀort, something diﬀerent when at least one did not provide eﬀort. Second,
we allow parties to write contracts where costly state veriﬁcation may occur
without divorcing.21 The utility of the low type in the case we are assuming
21This assumption implies that, when the match is good, parties may verify by means
of an arbitrator the eﬀort exerted by the partners, without loosing the beneﬁto fb e i n g
married.
48is the same as in the separating equilibrium and expressed in (7). The utility


















































































Recalling that for renegotiation proofness: T0 ≤ F, the suggested contract

















However, it is easy to prove that F
¯
0 > ¯ F,w h e r e ¯ F is deﬁned in conditions


































































































where the second inequality is a consequence of the fact that the second line
expression is decreasing in β1, while the third comes from the fact that the
third line is increasing in µh


















7p − 4p2 − 2
3(2− p)
≥ 0









Therefore, if we take p ≥ 0.36, there always exist an arbitrarily small c such
that (26) is satisﬁed. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5: Let consider any perfect Bayesian equilibrium
such that, for some state of the world, θ = θb < −1 and agents do not
divorce. It follows that in this state of the world either the proposer makes
a proposal but this proposal is rejected, or the proposer does not make any
proposal. The ﬁrst case cannot be an equilibrium, since the proposer can
increase her payoﬀ just not making any proposal. Let consider the second
case when in equilibrium the proposer does not make any proposal. This
equilibrium strategy has to be sustained by out of equilibrium beliefs of
the partner which assigns positive probability to the fact that the proposer
has not exerted eﬀort (only these beliefs may induce rejection). We show
that there always exists at least a proposal, namely the “fair” proposal,
such that these beliefs violate the D1 criterion. Let agent i be the proposer
and suppose that ei =1 . Denoted with π the probability that the partner
will accept the proposal and with αk the net transfer assigned to i by the
agreement. Agent i will propose an ex-post agreement instead of continuing
50the marriage if the following holds:






− c ≥ θb + k (27)
If instead ei =0and denoted with π0 the probability that the partner will









− c ≥ θb + k (28)
Let be α = 1
2 according to the proposal. After simple manipulation we can
prove that (27) is satisﬁed if:
π ≥
2θb + k +2 F +2 c
2F
= π (29)
while (28) is satisﬁed if:
π0 ≥
2θb +2 k +4 F +1+2 c
k +4 F +1
= π0
It is easy to check that π0 >π ,f o ras m a l lc. First of all, note that π0 >π
is equivalent to:
2θb +2 k +4 F +1+2 c
k +4 F +1
−




(2F + k +1 )( 2 θb + k +2 c)
2(k +4 F +1 )F
> 0
which holds if and only if
(2θb + k +2 c) < 0
which holds for any −θb > 1, given that k ≤ 2 and c suﬃciently small. It
follows that there exists a larger set of conjectures that i might hold that
induces i to deviate when ei =1with respect to when ei =0 .H e n c e f o r
the D1 criterion the partner should assign zero probability to the fact that
ei =0 . ¥
51